Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

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R 250745Z AUG 75 FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4015

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BUDAPEST 2738

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, MBFR, HU

SUBJECT: FONMIN PUJA ON CSCE AND MBFR

1. DURING AUGUST 21 MEETING WITH HUNGARIAN MONMIN ON ANOTHER SUBJECT (SEPTEL), PUJA INQUIRED ABOUT U.S. FOLLOW-UP TO CSCE HELSINKI DECLARATION. THEN, WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANSWER, HE VOLUN-TEERED THAT HUNGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTER HAS DECIDED TO PRINT AND DISTRIBUTE IN HUNGARIAN 100,000 BULKY COPIES OF FULL TEXT, A NUMBER WHICH LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS SUFFICIENT FOR NATION WITH PUPULATION OF JUST OVER 10 MILLION. ADMINISTRATIVE WORK IS NOW IN PROGRESS AND FULL TEXT WILL BE "FREELY AVAILABLE" TO ALL MANNER OF ORGANIZA-TIONS, TO MEDIA AND IN LIBRARIES AND IN SCHOOLS. SINCE FEW HUNGAR-IANS WILL HAVE TIME OR INCLINATION TO READ FULL TEXT, GOH ALSO PRE-PARING FOR PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION BOTH HIGHLIGHT SUMMARIES AND SERIES OF ATTRACTIVE, READILY UNDERSTANDABLE BOOKLETS DEALING WITH DIFFERENT THEMES ON WHICH THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT. MCAULIFFE REMARKED THAT HE TRUSTED THAT EDITORS OF SUMMARIES AND PAMPHLETS WOULD POSSESS SUFFICIENT CSCE BACKGROUND TO REFLECT TOTAL CONTEXT IN WHICH DECLARATION HAD BEEN DRAFTED AND TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF DOCUMENT TO WHICH SO MANY DIPLOMATS HAD DEVOTED MONTHS AND MONTHS OF LABOR. PUJA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A VERY REAL

PROBLEM WITH WHICH EACH PARTICIPATING CSCE NATION WOULD HAVE TO SECRET

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COPE, THAT ONE HAD TO HAVE SOME FAITH THAT EACH GOVERNMENT WOULD

DO ITS BEST, BUT THAT IT SEEMED INEVITABLE THAT SOME MINOR DISTORTIONS MIGHT CREEP INTO BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN SUMMARY PUBLICATION AS RESULT OF INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. PUJA FURTHER SAID -- HE HAD ADVISED UK FORIEGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN EARLIER-- THAT HIS MINISTRY NOW DEVELOPING PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS WHICH IT WILL PURSUE IN BILATERAL CONTEXT TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO CSCE DECLARATION.

- 3. MCAULIFFE SAID HE KNEW THAT WASHINGTON ALSO GIVING ATTENTION TO CSCE FOLLOW-UP IN CONSULTATION WITH U.S. CONGRESS. PUJA INTERRUPTED TO OBSERVE THAT HE HAD LEARNED TO HIS SORROW FROM MFN EXPERIENCE OF POWER U.S. CONGRESS WIELDS IN CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY; AND HE WAS THEREFORE PLEASED TO LEARN OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. E MCAULIFFE ADDED THAT HE WAS DIVULGING NO STATE SECRET BY SAYING THAT U.S. WAS OF COURSE CONFERRING WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT WAYS AND MEANS. PUJA NODDED, SAYING THERE ARE LIKE DISCUSSIONS AMONG OFFICIALS ON EASTERN SIDE. MCAULIFFE CALLED ATTENTION TO VARIOUS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS BY MOST SENIOR MEMBERS OF USG THAT, NOW THAT CSCE SUMMIT CONCLUDED, ONE HOPED FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND FORWARD MOVEMENT AT MBFR TALKS VIENNA IN EFFORT TO LOWER LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE MAINTAINING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT PERSONALLY SEEMED TO HIM TO BE PRUDENT FOR ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS TO KEEP A WEATHER EYE TO THE FUTURE IN VIEW OF BELGRADE MEETING IN 1977. ONE SHOULD NOT BUILD PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPECTATIONS TOO HIGH LEST PESSIMISM AND FRUSTRATION OVERWHELM THE CSCE NATIONS: ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE SHOULD BE RECORD OF SOLIC ALTHOUGH PERHAPS MODEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS THAT THOSE ATTENDING BELGRADE MEETING TWO YEARS HENCE CAN REVIEW. PUJA AGREED, AGAIN SAYING THAT HIS MINISTRY WORKING OUT PLANS FOR SPECIFIC, IDENTIFIABLE STEPS THAT CAN ACTUALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITHIN REASONABLE TIMESPAN.
- 4. PUJA THEN SAID GOH WHILE NOT DISPLEASED BY VIENNA MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION TALKS, ALSO NOW HOPES THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL RECEIVE SOME LATITUDE SO THEY CAN NEGOTIATE IN EARNEST AND ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS. PUJA SAID HE HAD VERY RECENTLY LEARNED FROM RELIABLE "FOREIGN SOURCE" THAT U.S. NOW WILLING TO REDUCE ITS TACTICAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND REDUCE CERTAIN DELIVERY SYSTEMS. MCAULIFFE RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW OF NO SUCH SECRET

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DECISION. THERE HAD, OF COURSE, BEEN MANY SERIOUS AND DETAILED STUDIES AND RE-STUDIES OF WESTERN DEFENSE PLANS BY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN RECENT YEARS; VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS HAD EMERGED FROM THESE STUDIES AS TO THE BEST WAY TO COUNTER THE MILITARY AND PSYCHO-POLITICAL THREAT POSED BY THE MASS OF ARMOR ON THE NORTH GERMAN PLAIN; BUT HE PERSONALLY KNEW OF NO DECISION BY THE U.S. OR ITS ALLIES WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIATE REPORT THAT FONMIN HAD RECEIVED.

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5. AFTER MOMENT OF REFLECTION, PUJA SAID HE SINCERELY HOPED VIENNA TALKS WOULD SUCCEED. BUT SPEED AND RANGE OF MODERN AIRCRAFT, THEIR CAPABILITY TO DELIVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALONG WITH INCREASING RANGE AND ACCURACY OF MISSLE SYSTEMS NOT COVERED IN SALT TALKS CAUSED HIM TO DOUBT THAT ONE COULD WORK OUT AGREEMENT APPLYING TO RELATIVELY SMALL "CONTROLLED AREA" IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAT WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT MANY SMALLER STATES. MCAULIFFE OBSERVED THAT U.S. UNDERSTOOD THAT HUNGARY'S POSITION AS OF NOW FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN IS NOT TO ALLOW ITS ARMED FORCES OR THOSE OF ANY OTHER NATION STATION ON HUNGARIAN SOIL TO BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTION PROCESS. PUJA NODDED HIS ASSENT SAYING HUNGARY IS SO-CALLED INDIRECT PARTICI-PANT AT VIENNA. HIS COUNTRY FACES MILITARY THRUST FROM WEST AND ALSO FROM SOUTH; AND HE FEELS SOME CONCERN THAT WESTERN MILITARY FORCES REMOVED FROM REDUCTION ZONE MIGHT BE RELOCATION IN AND AROUND MED-ITERRANEAN TO DETRIMENT OF HUNGARY'S NATIONAL SECURITY. THEN, AFTER SCOFFING AT IDEA THAT ARMED FORMATIONS ON NORTH GERMAN PLAIN CONSTI-TUTE ANY THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE IN FACE OF SUPERIOR NATO AIRPOWER, PUJA MUSED THAT, IF MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS ONLY PERMITTED. HUNGARY COULD PUT TO GOOD USE IN ITS FIELDS AND FACTORIES FIVE OR TEN THOUSAND OF THE ABLE YOUNG MEN NOW IN ITS ARMED FORCES. MCAULIFFE VIGOROUSLY REBUTTED FONMIN'S CONTENTION THAT ARMOR ON NORTH GERMAN PLAIN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHO-POLITICAL THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPEANS AND SAID HE REMAINS BASICALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT, AFTER SOME HARD AND REALISTIC BARGAINING AT VIENNA, A MODEST MBFR I AGREEMENT

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WILL EMERGE AND THEN PERHAPS SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS MUCH IN THE SAME PATTERN AS SALT. PUJA SAID HE WAS PUZZLED AND AWED BY CERTAINTY WITH WHICH WESTERN NEGOTIATORS AT VIENNA DISCUSS WARSAW PACT ORDER OF BATTLE DATA SUCH AS NUMBER OF TANKS AND ARTILLERY PIECES. HE SAID HUNGARY WOULD CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AT VIENNA BUT THAT HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT CONSTRUCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED UNTIL AIRPOWER IS INCLUDED IN THE EQUATION. HE THEN SAID COST, SPEED, RANGE, ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY AND ACCURACY OF MODERN AIRCRAFT POSES—IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW—SEVERE AND INCREASING PROBLEM FOR SMALL COUNTRIES, WHETHER EASTERN, WESTERN OR NEUTRAL. WHILE MAJOR NATIONS MAY EMERGE FROM MBFR WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, PUJA EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL DOUBTS THAT SMALLER EUROPEAN STATES WILL BE SO LUCKY.

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